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DUE PROCESS
CITY COURT
RENSSELAER COUNTY
People v. Boulton1 85
(decided March 3, 1995)
Defendant, William B. Boulton, challenged the constitutionality
of New York Vehicle and Traffic Law section 1193(2)(e)(7)(a) 186
which mandated that the court, during a defendant's arraignment
for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, suspend the
defendant's driver's license pending the prosecution of said
charge. 187 Defendant claimed that the suspension of his license
violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Federal 188 and New York State Constitutions189 and in addition,
the Separation of Powers Doctrine. 190
185. 164 Misc. 2d 604, 625 N.Y.S.2d 428 (City Ct. Rensselaer County
1995).
186. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1193(2)(e)(7)(a) (MWKinney Supp. 1995).
Section 1193(2)(e)(7)(a) provides in pertinent part:
A court shall suspend a driver's license pending prosecution, of any
person charged with a violation of subdivision two or three of section
eleven hundred ninety-two of this article [operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of drugs or alcohol] who, at the time of
arrest, is alleged to have had .10 of one percent or more by weight of
alcohol in such driver's blood as shown by chemical analysis of blood,
breath, urine or saliva ....
Id.
187. Boulton, 164 Misc. 2d at 605, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
188. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This provision provides in pertinent
part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law...." Id. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This
provision provides in pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." Id.
189. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. This provision provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof." Id.
190. Boulton, 164 Misc. 2d at 605, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 429. U.S. CONST. art.
H, § 2, cl. 1. This provision provides in pertinent part: "[J]udicial Power
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The city court held that the defendant's right to due process
was not violated. 191 The court reasoned that due process was
afforded to the defendant by the process which permitted his
driver license to be returned upon his ex parte presentation of
evidence introduced to rebut the court's decision. 192 The court
also noted that although there are instances when the judiciary's
responsibilities encroach on those allocated to the Executive
Branch, the application of section 1193(2)(e)(7)(a) of the Vehicle
and Traffic Law is not an example of one of those instances. 193
Thus, there was no violation of the Separation of Powers
Doctrine. 194
Lastly, after applying the rational basis test, the court held that
the defendant was not deprived of his equal protection rights. 195
Although a person who is accused of driving while intoxicated in
violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law section 1192(2) may be
treated differently from those who are accused of driving while
intoxicated or driving while impaired by the use of a drug, in
violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law sections 1192(3)196 and
1192(4), 197 the differences in treatment do not violate either State
or Federal Equal Protection Clauses. 198
The defendant was accused of driving while intoxicated per se,
driving while intoxicated and driving in excess of the maximum
speed limit in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law sections
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority.. . ." Id.
191. Boulton, 164 Misc. 2d at 607, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 608, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 431.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(3) (McKinney Supp. 1995). This
section provides in pertinent part: "No person shall operate a motor vehicle
while in an intoxicated condition." Id.
197. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(4) (McKinney Supp. 1995). This
section provides in pertinent part: "No person shall operate a motor vehicle
while the person's ability to operate such a motor vehicle is impaired by the
use of a drug as defined in this chapter." Id.
198. Id.
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1192(2), 1192(3) and 1180(d), respectively. 199 Subsequently, the
court suspended his driver's license pursuant to section
1193(2)(e)(7)(a) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.20 0 In its notice
of motion in support of an order to terminate the suspension, the
defense raised three constitutional claims. 20 1
First, the defendant contended that Vehicle and Traffic Law
section 1193(2)(e)(7)(a) deprived him of due process because he
was not entitled to a preliminary hearing before the suspension of
his license.202 Second, the defendant argued that the court
violated the separation of powers provisions of the Federal and
New York State Constitutions. 203 Third, the defense claimed that
the suspension violated his right to equal protection because a
driving while intoxicated per se violation, pursuant to section
1192(2) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, is treated differently
from driving while intoxicated and driving while impaired by the
use of a drug violation pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law
sections 1192(3) and 1192(4).204
In its due process analysis, the court first examined the two-
prong test for suspending a drivers license set forth in Vehicle
and Traffic Law section 1193(2)(e)(7)(b). 205 Before the court
199. Id. at 605, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
200. Id. See supra note 186.
201. Boulton, 164 Misc. 2d at 605, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
202. Id. at 606-07, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
203. Id. at 608, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 430-31.
204. Id. at 608, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 431.
205. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1193(2)(e)(7)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
Section 1193(2)(e)(7)(b) provides in pertinent part:
In order for the court to impose such suspension it must find that the
accusatory instrument conforms to the requirement of section 100.40 of
the criminal procedure law and there exists reasonable cause to believe
that the holder operated a motor vehicle while such holder had .10 of
one percent or more by weight of alcohol in his or her blood as was
shown by chemical analysis of such person's blood, breath, urine or
saliva, made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven hundred
ninety-four of this article. At the time of such license suspension the
holder shall be entitled to an opportunity to make a statement regarding
these two issues and to present evidence tending to rebut the court's
findings.
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may suspend a license, the court must first find that "the
accusatory instrument conforms to the requirements of [CPL]
100.40."206 In the event that it does not, the court must return
the license and "either divest itself of jurisdiction or require the
prosecutor to amend the defective accusatory instrument." 207 As
206. Boulton, 164 Misc. 2d at 606, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 429 (quoting N.Y.
VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1193(2)(e)(7)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1995)). See N.Y.
ChuM. PROC. LAw § 100.40 (McKinney 1992). Section 100.40 provides:
1. An information, or a count thereof, is sufficient on its face when:
(a) It substantially conforms to the requirements prescribed in
section 100.15; and
(b) The allegations of the factual part of the information, together
with those of any supporting depositions which may
accompany it, provide reasonable cause to believe that the
defendant committed the offense charged in the accusatory
part of the information; and
(c) Non-hearsay allegations of the factual part of the information
and/or of any supporting depositions establish, if true, every
element of the offense charged and the defendant's
commission thereof.
2. A simplified information is sufficient on its face when, as provided
by subdivision one of section 100.25, it substantially conforms to
the requirement therefor prescribed by or pursuant to law;
provided that when the filing of a supporting deposition is ordered
by the court pursuant to subdivision two of said section 100.25, a
failure of the complainant police officer or public servant to
comply with such order within the time provided by subdivision
two of said section 100.25 renders the simplified information
insufficient on its face.
3. A prosecutor's information, or a count thereof, is sufficient on its
face when it substantially conforms to the requirement prescribed
in section 100.35.
4. A misdemeanor complaint or a felony complaint, or a count thereof,
is sufficient on its face when:
(a) It substantially conforms to the requirements prescribed in
section 100.15; and
(b) The allegations of the factual part of such accusatory
instrument and/or any supporting depositions which may
accompany it, provide reasonable cause to believe that the
defendant committed the offense charged in the accusatory
part of such instrument.
Id.
207. Boulton, 164 Misc. 2d at 606, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
830 [Vol 12
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the court stated, this "CPL 100.40 review.., which requires a
court to suspend a license pending prosecution does not afford
the defendant any more due process than he or she is otherwise
already entitled to." 208
The second part of the analysis requires a finding of
"reasonable cause" under Vehicle and Traffic Law section
1193(2)(e)(7)(b). 20 9 The court then compared a felony complaint
to "simplified traffic information" and a "supporting
deposition." 2 10 On one hand, a defendant arraigned on a felony
complaint is entitled to a prompt hearing under CPL section
180.10(2)211 and that CPL section 180.60 describes the due
process which must be afforded to a defendant at this preliminary
hearing.2 12 On the other hand, a defendant charged with driving
while intoxicated is not given a preliminary hearing. 2 13
However, "a requested Supporting Deposition must contain
'allegations of fact.., providing reasonable cause to believe that
the defendant committed the offense. ' " 2 14 The court concluded
that:
208. Id.
209. Id. at 606, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 430. N.Y. Cm. PROC. LAW § 70.10(2)
(McKinney 1992). Section 70.10(2) describes "reasonable cause" as follows:
"Reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense"
exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses
facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and
persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence,
judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense
was committed and that such person committed it. Except as otherwise
provided in this chapter, such apparently reliable evidence may include
or consist of hearsay.
Id.
210. Boulton, 164 Misc. 2d at 606, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 430. See N.Y. ClM.
PRoc. LAw § 1.20(5) (McKinney 1992); N.Y. CRlM. PROC. LAW § 100.20
(McKinney 1992).
211. N.Y. ClM. PROC. LAW § 180.10(2) (McKinney 1992). The due
process afforded to a defendant charged with a felony is more particularly
described in N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.60.
212. Boulton, 164 Misc. 2d at 606, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
213. Id. at 607, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
214. Id. (quoting N.Y. Clal. PRoc. LAW § 100.25(2) (McKinney 1992)).
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It does not appear that the reasonable cause review that is called
for under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193(2)(e)(7)(b) gives a
defendant any more due process than he or she is not otherwise
entitled to when a simplified traffic information and supporting
deposition are filed with the court.2 15
Although the court conceded that treatment between felony and
driving while intoxicated complaints differ, the court has the
power to suspend a license whether or not section
1193(2)(e)(7)(a) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was enacted, as
long as it adhered to the above described two-prong analysis. 216
The court stated that "[t]he due process afforded to the defendant
is not found in the process of taking the license, but in the
process of its return." 217 At that time, the defendant may present
evidence that "tend[s] to rebut" the court's decision.218 The court
reasoned that "the defendant is in a position to exercise his or her
due process rights without constraint" because the prosecution is
not involved during that phase. 219 Accordingly, the court held
that section 1193(2)(e)(7)(a) does not violate the defendant's right
to due process. 220
The second constitutional claim the defense raised was that
section 1193(2)(e)(7)(a) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law violated
the Separation of Powers Doctrine. 221 The court focused on New
York Vehicle and Traffic Law section 510, which provides:
"Any magistrate, justice or judge, in a city, in a town, or in a
village, any supreme court justice, any county judge, any judge
of a district court ... shall have power to revoke or suspend the
license to drive a motor vehicle or motorcycle of any
person ... "222 Therefore, the court is empowered to
215. Boulton, 164 Misc. 2d at 607, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. (quoting N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1193(2)(e)(7)(b) (McKinney
Supp. 1995)).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 608, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
222. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 510 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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"temporarily suspend" an individual's driver's license.223
With respect to this claim, the court indicated that "the
responsibilities of the judiciary on occasion overlaps with the
duties and responsibilities of the executive branch[;]" however,
the subject statute does not place the court in such a dilemma. 224
In sum, the court held that section 1193(2)(e)(7)(a) of the Vehicle
and Traffic Law does not violate the State and Federal Separation
of Powers Doctrine. 225
Lastly, the court evaluated the equal protection claim by
utilizing the rational basis test.226 The defense argued that courts
treat defendants charged with driving while intoxicated per se,
pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law section 1192(2), differently
than defendants charged with driving while intoxicated or driving
while impaired by drugs, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law
sections 1192(3) and 1192(4), respectively, and that the differing
treatments violated the defendant's right to equal protection of the
laws.227 Although the court found that those respective charges
were treated differently, no equal protection violation existed in
either the New York State or Federal Constitutions.228
Therefore, the court concluded that "[i]t is not impermissible to
treat a person who pleads guilty differently from a person who
pleads not guilty." 229
223. Boulton, 164 Misc. 2d at 608, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 430-31.
224. Id. at 608, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 431.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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